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ABSTRACT
The European Commission’s Investment Plan for Europe and the enduring 
economic crisis has brought state-owned development banks again to the fore of 
public and scholarly debate in Europe. This article proposes to place these banks’ 
activities and recent institutional co-operation in the context of European 
integration and assumes a historical perspective on European economic 
governance and development banking. Most importantly, it argues that the 
European Investment Bank has become a centre of gravity in long-standing 
political attempts to increase the investment firepower of the European 
Union. Based on detailed process-tracing analysis through publicly available data 
and interview material, the article delineates a gradual process of institutional 
innovation and network formation that advanced since the late 1980s and 
culminated in recent post-crisis policy processes. The contemporary visibility of 
development banking in Europe, we conclude, follows from these and is 
representative of a nucleus for a – somewhat hidden – European investment 
state, whose reach and stability, however, is yet to be determined.
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Introduction
The post-crisis restructuring of the European economy has brought political 
and academic attention to a heretofore rather backstage operating actor in 
the financial landscape, state-owned development banks.1 The European 
Investment Bank (EIB), which is the multilateral development bank of the 
European Union (EU), as well as national development banks (NDBs) were 
called upon by policy-makers to expand their activities to fuel investment 
across the Union. Accordingly, most of these banks expanded their balance 
sheets significantly between 2007 and 2014: the EIB increased its assets by 
almost 100 per cent, the large Italian Cassa Depositi e Prestiti (CDP) and 
German Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW) by roughly 80 and 40 per
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cent respectively, and a small NDB like the Finnish Finnvera by a staggering
275 per cent.2 Simultaneously, one could observe a new wave of institutional
diffusion of development banks in Europe. Since 2010, several member states
have engaged in founding new financial institutions that promote socioeco-
nomic development – among them Ireland (Strategic Banking Corporation
of Ireland in 2014), Portugal (Instituição Financeira de Desenvolvimento in
2014) and the United Kingdom (UK) (British Business Bank and Green Invest-
ment Bank in 2012) – such that every EU country today holds at its behest one
such institution or is amid the founding process (DG Internal Policies 2016a).
The importance of development banks to the current European political
economy came to the fore after Jean-Claude Juncker’s election as President
of the European Commission (EC) in November 2014, when the Investment
Plan for Europe and its European Fund for Strategic Investment (EFSI)
became the prime attempt to bolster economic recovery in the EU. A key
feature of this plan was its implementation through the EIB that was equipped
to leverage funds from the EU budget to mobilize private investment. Further-
more, NDBs received positions as both stakeholders and contributors, on
which the success of the plan was said to hinge critically (European Commis-
sion 2014; European Commission 2015b). Surprisingly, scholars of European
integration and political economy have not reflected much on these obser-
vations yet. Those contributions tackling the growing importance and role
of development banks in the European Union have mainly welcomed and
advocated this trend, explaining it by the counter-cyclical function these
banks traditionally fulfil (Griffith-Jones and Cozzi 2016; Griffith-Jones and
Tyson 2013; Kollatz-Ahnen 2015; Mazzucato and Penna 2016).3
However, this functional explanation misses important points about the
institutional evolution of European economic governance and the historical
trajectory of development banking in the European political economy. The
fact that, before the crisis, state banking was severely under pressure of Euro-
pean liberalization policies and even declared near death (Seikel 2014; Verdier
2000) begs for historical and political placement of recent events. The outlined
growth of the EIB and its national counterparts, this article therefore contends,
is significantly rooted in two parallel processes of European integration. First, it
is intrinsically linked to a long-standing political quest for a European invest-
ment state that compensates poor fiscal capacity on the supranational level.
Development banks, in this sense, have become increasingly relevant to
create a governmental infrastructure that ties together the fragmented land-
scape of European economic policy-making. Second, the recent diffusion and
activities of development banks rest on a historical lineage of innovating
financial instruments that depart from the traditional business of subsidized
lending and instead tap European budgetary resources based on leveraging
and revolving funds. Again, this has gradually allowed for intensified co-
ordination between different levels of policy-making in Europe. Importantly,
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in both realms, the financial and economic crisis has served as a catalyst of
these processes, but was not their original driver. Rather, the EC’s Investment
Plan for Europe interlocked several less-visible institutional and policy-making
tendencies of the last three decades into what might be the nucleus of a Euro-
pean investment state. In its basic tenet, this investment state provides a
gradually built multilevel infrastructure for furthering investment, allowing
supranational, national and subnational actors such as development banks
to ‘make use of Europe’ (Woll and Jacquot 2010) by channelling leveraged
funds into the ‘real economy’.
To develop this argument, the article proceeds as follows. The next section
reviews the literature on development banking in the European political
economy and proposes several theoretical avenues to make our observations
fruitful for debates on European integration more generally. We then move on
to follow the evolution of the EIB and NDBs within European economic gov-
ernance through four historical sections, based on process-tracing methods
and both document analysis and expert interviews (see Appendix). This dia-
chronic approach enables us to juxtapose qualitative transformations such
as the formation of new institutional ties between development banks, the
EC and member states with gradual adjustments in development bank
activity. These sections will concomitantly discuss these trends in European
development banking in the light of several pillars of current economic gov-
ernance, including the reform of fiscal capacity, state-aid regulations and sub-
sidiarity, arguing that they coalesce to provide the ground for a hidden
European investment state on which we conclude.
Development banks in the European political economy
State-owned development banks have the ‘mission’ to promote pre-defined
socioeconomic goals. Their role, institutional set-up, and size have differed
significantly across countries and are closely linked to the historical trajectory
of national political economies and their distinctive public–private financial
networks to furnish growth and development (Shonfield 1965; Zysman
1983). The literature on European economic governance has largely ignored
their specifics, instead just noting their conflict with a liberal European
order. An emerging body of literature on the role NDBs in the European pol-
itical economy has pointed out that over the past two decades European neo-
liberal regulatory policies have constrained these banks’ manoeuvrability
significantly, mainly on the grounds of competition and state-aid consider-
ations (Volberding 2016). However, their role in the single market or the Euro-
pean financial system has generally not received scholarly attention.
The financial crisis of 2008, after which these banks moved into the spot-
light again, has triggered research emphasizing the counter-cyclical role of
development banks in severe downturns-cum-credit-crunches. The former
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EIB vice-president Kollatz-Ahnen (2015), for instance, has focused on state
investment banks’ impact on growth through the provision of venture
capital, while Mazzucato and Penna (2016) have collected evidence for devel-
opment banks’ importance in boosting innovation as well as furthering socio-
economic and environmental progress. While the strong advocacy stance of
this literature may partly explain the recent trends around development
banking in Europe, they seem less fruitful for connecting them to the Euro-
pean integration process.
When adding the multilateral EIB to this group of banks, one may expect the
image to change. An EU institution in its own right (although legally categorized
as ‘body’) and assigned with the task ‘to contribute, by having recourse to the
capital market and utilizing its own resources, to the balanced and steady devel-
opment of the common market in the interest of the Community’ in the 1957
Treaty of Rome (Treaty of the European Community [TEC], Art. 130), the EIB and
its ‘essential role in financing European integration’ (Dinan 1999: 324; cf. Nugent
2006) is widely acknowledged among scholars of the European Union.
However, a closer look reveals that the literature has hardly overcome Robin-
son’s (2009: 669) description of the EIB as a ‘neglected institution’ that needs
‘a serious programme of academic study’ to understand the overall ‘nature of
EU policy making’. Particularly, debates over the public policy role of the EIB
have been rare (Honohan 1995; Licari 1969), and despite the EIB having
stepped up in public appearance and actual lending in recent years, with pol-
itical struggles preceding a major capital increase of €10bn in 2012, scholarly
work on it remains sporadic (but see Griffith-Jones and Tyson [2013] for a
thorough review of EIB’s activities in the EU).
The merit of both Honohan’s (1995) and Robinson’s (2009) work is its
embedding the EIB in the framework of multilevel governance, which
enables a less functional-economic but more political view on European
development banking. Most importantly, this view highlights the EIB’s role
in the broader set of European institutions and governance, drawing attention
to its relation to both the EC and member states. For instance, peculiar pro-
cesses of fund implementation in regional policy involving the EIB have
made it a central actor in the facilitation of EU integration objectives. As we
will show in this article, the EIB’s relation to other banks, particularly NDBs,
is no less important than its relation to other EU decision-making bodies
when seeking to understand its growing reach.
In this context, we find it promising to think about the meaning and trans-
formation of these relations with reference to academic discussions on ‘forms
of state’ and ‘core state powers’ in the European Union (Caporaso 1996;
Genschel and Jachtenfuchs 2016). These debates are usually concerned
with how the evolution of the EU fits into longer-term processes of federal
state-building and draw attention to the development of specific forms of
authority and policy-making capabilities in relation to their member states
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over time (Richardson 2012). Scholarship argues that the lack of fundamental
territorial powers on the EU level have led to the rise of a regulatory state,
intervening in member states’ core functions without developing similar insti-
tutions on the supranational level (Majone 1997). The current crisis, however,
has again sparked the debate as to what extent the EU moves beyond this
description and engages in a new wave of institution building, significantly
furthering the integration process (Caporaso et al. 2015; Schimmelfennig
2014).
In this debate, scholars have repeatedly pointed to the underdevelopment
of traditional taxing-and-spending functions at the supranational level, and its
accompanying low levels of steering capacity and fiscal impact. Our study
offers ways to take development banks as quasi-fiscal actors more thoroughly
into account in the expansion of EU steering capacity. Clearly, the current pol-
itical quest to tackle the EU’s ‘investment gap’ creates tensions with a govern-
ance mode based on ‘rule making replacing taxing and spending’ (Majone
1997). However, instead of focussing on an outright fiscal capacity on the
European level, our study considers instances of EU capacity-building and
policy-making that entail functional equivalences.
To this end, we draw on recent attempts defining states as ‘developmental
networks states’ (Block 2008) or as ‘entrepreneurial’ (Mazzucato 2015) when
they dispose over governmental agencies, including state-owned investment
banks, that are ‘able to take risks and create a highly networked system of
actors that harness the best of the private sector for the national good over
a medium- to long-term time horizon’ (ibid. : 26). Such structures may not
always be visible in the first place, but can emerge in a somewhat hidden
fashion circumventing political opposition (Block 2008). However, we prefer
the notion of an ‘investment state’, which highlights the idea that polities
develop a governmental infrastructure promoting investment in specific
sectors in the economy either through direct spending or through financial
techniques mobilizing other public or private funds. This can possibly
surpass the mobilization of national powers to compensate for the lack of
EU infrastructural powers, as sketched by Genschel and Jachtenfuchs
(2016), and create genuine supranational capacities by allowing other policy
actors to ‘make use of Europe’, accessing new political, institutional and bud-
getary resources (Woll and Jacquot 2010).
Along these lines, we propose to frame the study of development banks in
the European political economy. It presents a case for thinking about the
gradual ways of institution building, tie-knotting and network formation in
the field of economic policy-making, as well as the historical pathway to
the EU’s crisis responses (Verdun 2015). More precisely, it tries to reveal the
stepwise build-up of a durable governance structure over an extended
period that increases the EU’s power to generate and direct investment
through the involvement of (supra)national development banks.
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Economic governance and development banks in the ‘old’
European political economy, 1957–1988
Considering the role of development banks in European economic govern-
ance, we can characterize a first period from the Treaty of Rome to some
years before the Maastricht Treaty as one of institutionalization and relative
stability. First, the EIB was mainly a member state bank and its relation to
the EC rather muted. Responding to the needs of its shareholders was at
the very heart of EIB governance. The board of governors, which must
approve of the annual accounts and major policy proposals, consisted
and still consists of the national finance ministers; and the board of direc-
tors, deciding on the operational strategy and approving all financing oper-
ations, is composed of member state delegates with one vote for each
country. The European Commission appoints a single delegate to the
board of directors.
Just as its focus in the founding period was to function as an infrastructure
investment bank, especially for Italy, it became a crucial tool both to integrate
new member states and mitigate the concerns of old member states. For
instance, when Spain and Portugal were set to enter the Community in
1986, they already had received pre-accession aid and loans from the EIB,
which also stepped up lending after accession to buffer established
member states’ concerns over regional disparities and competition (interview
#9; Bussière et al. 2008). The first three decades of EIB existence were ones of
striking a balance between the statutory mandate to serve the Community
goals on behalf of the member states and the bank’s autonomy that
allowed it to shield itself from political lending interference and enabled it
to raise capital on the markets (Licari 1969: 194). Nonetheless, the EIB in
this period went through some changes in terms of activities, capital
increases, and strategic goals, driven both by the enlargement of the Commu-
nity and the first and second oil crises (Bussière et al. 2008; Clifton et al. 2014).
Only few, however, indicate the early tensions of an unfulfilled European
investment state.
This is the case because the period in consideration is similarly one of insti-
tutionalization in terms of EU fiscal capacity. Most importantly, besides the
common agricultural policy the subsequent establishment of structural
funds became the main vehicles of discretionary spending and, thus, a funda-
mental pillar of economic policy-making in the EU. The European Social Fund,
already enshrined in the Treaty of Rome, and the European Regional Develop-
ment Fund, founded in 1975, following Britain’s accession, became the largest
to tackle unemployment and structural change in the Union (Streeck and
Elsässer 2014: 10). But, despite several revenue-based reforms, the cost of
enlargement put the EU budget and the structural funds increasingly under
pressure (Lindner 2006), leading the EC to search for new means of
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funding. When investment stalled in the years after the first oil crisis, the Com-
mission responded to the Council’s call on member states with the implemen-
tation of the New Community Instrument (NCI), or ‘Ortoli facility’.
The NCI, active between 1977 and 1990 and supplement to the structural
funds, enabled the Commission to borrow money that could be lent to
regions and member states for infrastructure and energy projects, based on
Council approval. Importantly, the Commission neither borrowed the
money nor managed the fund on its own, but in conjunction with the EIB
(European Union 1999: 89). As far as we can see, the NCI was (only) the first
episode of EC–EIB co-operation resting upon the need for more investment
spending in the face of fiscal restraint, whose main precedents were EC-
initiated loan applications to the EIB. The NCI co-operation, however, was
little more than a one-off measure, as member states remained by and
large the dominant stakeholder group, proposing most of the projects and
being the main source of political influence (interview #10; cf. Föcking 2001;
Bussière et al. 2008).4
To promote investment, the six founding member states also had develop-
ment banks at their disposal, though not necessarily on national but regional
levels. While Luxembourg was the latest to found one in 1977 Société Natio-
nale de Crédit et d’Investissement (SNCI), of the new member states in this
period only Spain (re)founded its development institution Instituto de
Credito Oficial (ICO). Their emerging relationship with EU level activities,
and the EIB especially, was mainly one of competition in the period under
observation. The fact that the EIB had larger financing possibilities and was
explicitly designed to operate in the entire EU was as important as the
overlap in targeting the same ‘underdeveloped’ regions. This animosity was
particularly strong with respect to KfW, rival in size to the EIB and primus
inter pares among European NDBs (interviews #2; #8; #9; Honohan 1995).
From its inception, the EIB was aware of this tension and actively aimed at
establishing co-operative working relationships with development banks
through on-lending and occasional global loan agreements.
This was prominently achieved in Italy, where the EIB – under the auspices
of two Italian presidents between 1958 and 1970 – became the key source of
finance for the Mezzogiorno, mainly through public financial institutions such
as the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno.5 However, this sort of early co-operation was
never so comprehensive that it would result into some institutionalized form
of community economic governance. Rather, when the EIB and NDBs increas-
ingly tapped the same capital markets and started to compete for funds and
projects more heavily, competitive concerns loomed larger than the need to
expand co-operation. In this sense, Figure 1 roughly illustrates this early web
of relations centred around development banks in the European political
economy – a rather unconnected and fragmented image with a relatively
clear allocation of competences and resources.
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The historical trajectory: the gradual transformation of
EIB-based public policy interventions 1988–2005
In the period between 1988 and 2005, we observe a range of policy changes
and institutional reforms that can be linked to the initial set-up and simul-
taneously lay a fundament for the post-crisis era. Several reforms and pro-
grammes were implemented in an ad hoc manner but turned out to be
long-term qualitative transformations. To begin, the challenges and con-
straints depicted in the section above led to new initiatives for increasing
the impact of the structural funds in the late 1980s. Against the background
of the Single European Act, European policy-makers discussed three interwo-
ven concerns: first, concerns over economic growth and rising unemploy-
ment; second, concerns over the community’s limited own resources; and
third, concerns over the efficiency of structural policy (Endo 1999; Stahl
1992). Subsequently, on the initiative of EC President Jacques Delors, the
Council adopted an action plan for reforming the funds and doubling its
volume within the first multiannual financial framework (MFF) between
1988 and 1992.
One of the respective regulations (EEC 2052/88) highlighted that enhanced
co-operation between different funds and policies was necessary to achieve a
greater impact, and mainly addressed the EIB’s role in promoting the treaty
objectives as overlapping with the structural funds. In its subsequent regu-
lation, the Council then stated that ‘the Commission must, where necessary,
associate the EIB with the preparation of its decisions; whereas the EIB is pre-
pared to cooperate in the implementation of this Regulation, in keeping with
its own powers and responsibilities’ (EEC 4253/88). In other words, the quest
for a more efficient use of the investment instruments at disposal at the Euro-
pean level furnished initiatives to institutionalize a closer co-operation
between the Commission and the EIB. Particularly the 1988 reform of struc-
tural funds laid the fundament for what we will depict below as the nucleus
for an investment state, introducing new governing principles such as ‘pro-
gramming’, ‘additionality’ and ‘partnership’ (Bachtler and Méndez 2007:
Figure 1. Development banks in the ‘old’ European political economy, 1957–1988.
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537). These included the objective to enhance long-term co-operation within
a multilevel system, while entailing the use of loans next to subsidies.6
In the early 1990s, the gradual rapprochement of EIB and EC intensified.
Because of a ‘European growth initiative’ from 1992 and the following Edin-
burgh council, the EIB received a capital increase to target infrastructure
investment. Importantly, an additional body was also founded to increase
the financing power of the EIB (Endo 1999: 194; interview #9): the European
Investment Fund (EIF). First, the EIF was constructed as a joint venture
between the EIB, the European Commission, and the financial sector
(mostly NDBs) so that its simple establishment foreshadowed a new period
of co-operation between these actors (interview #9). Second, the EIF, set up
to fill a perceived gap in the risk financing capacity in the EU, became an
active participant in financial markets, employing among other things guaran-
tees to leverage its own funds in financial transactions. As such, the EIF was
from its inception linked to financial instruments, a new way of leveraging
limited EU budgetary resources.
Introduced into the EU Budget in 1993, financial instruments were first
used in the MFF of 1994–1999. The idea underlying these instruments was
and is to transform EU resources (e.g. within the structural funds) into financial
products (loans, guarantees, equity, etc.) which are then used to support pro-
jects promoting EU policies (European Court of Auditors 2016: 11). The crucial
difference to grants and subsidies is that they can use private funds to
increase leverage and, in case these projects succeed, generate a repayment
which can be used for further projects (revolving funds). The main institutions
administering these funds were the EIB and the EIF (DG Internal Policies 2012),
a fact which brought EIB and EC closer together.
Only a few years later, the 1997 Amsterdam council carried these impulses
forward. In its Resolution on Growth and Employment, it called on the EIB and
the EIF ‘to step up its activities … promoting investment projects consistent
with sound banking principles and practices’ and reach into new areas of
financing, particularly education, health, urban environment and environ-
mental protection. This led, in July 1997, to the EIB’s board approving the
Amsterdam Special Action Programme (ASAP), which again furthered the pro-
minence of guarantees and risk assumptions (EIB press release, 12 Dec 1997).
While in both instances the anti-cyclical role of the EIB was very strong, it
was pre-conditioned by Europe’s turn to institutionalized fiscal restraint
through the Stability and Growth Pact. References to balanced budgets and
stable macroeconomic conditions abound in the documents and emphasize
the need to mobilize new funds promoting investment across the Union.
This became particularly clear with the Lisbon Agenda in which the strategy’s
goals would rely primarily on private sector funds and public–private partner-
ships. While the Union’s role was explicitly said to act as a catalyst, the Council
approved of a prominent role of the EIB in achieving the goals of the Agenda
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(Lisbon European Council, 23–24 March 2000). The EIB itself, just as some of its
national counterparts, became active players in the liberalization process of
the 1990s and early 2000s (Bussière et al. 2008; Clifton et al. 2014).
Interestingly, the political implications of post-socialist transition in this
period were also significant for development banking in Europe at large.
Besides the founding of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment (EBRD), many Eastern European countries, such as Slovakia, Slovenia or
Croatia followed the idea of public financial institutions for development and
founded them in close co-operation with European development banks (cf.
interview #8).7 German Reunification also led to an intensified relationship
between KfW and the EIB, with the latter providing funds for the restructuring
of the East German economy.
In sum, the EIB grew considerably in importance regarding the manage-
ment of structural funds, and with crises overshadowing Europe in the early
1990s could increase its capital and expand with a new organizational tool
at its disposal. While most of the single measures were ad hoc in their
implementation, the new strategies, products and organizational capabilities
solidified – and they provided the institutional innovation on which to build in
future negotiations. This became strikingly clear when negotiations over the
programming period from 2007 onwards started, further increasing the role
of financial instruments and co-operation between both the EIB and the EC
as well as the EIB/EIF and NDBs. Over the observation period, the programme
contributions to financial instruments increased significantly. Non-existent in
the first MFF, they added up to €0.57bn in the 1994–1999 framework, and
increased to €1.3bn in the following framework of 2000–2006.
The proliferation and expanded use of financial instruments had several
rationales. First, EU ambitions to influence structural policy were severely
limited by the comparatively small size of its budget, a conundrum that finan-
cial instruments helped to overcome. In this respect, both the use of leverage
as well as the possibility for the return of funds to the EU budget in case of
successful project realization were attractive properties of this policy instru-
ment. In the context of the high ambitions of the Lisbon Agenda and an EU
budget decreasing in terms of gross national product (GNP), these financial
instruments would substantially expand over the course of the next decade,
laying further foundations for the ‘Juncker Plan’.
The financial crisis, growth of NDBs and network formation
2005–2014
This third historical section considers the latest innovations and events
leading up to the recent Investment Plan for Europe from the perspective
of development – or as it was now officially termed – ‘promotional’
banking. First, the expanded use of financial instruments would be set on a
10
larger institutional footing with the 2007–2014 MFF, as new programmes were
being designed by the EIB. Called upon by the European Council in December
2005 to ‘extend its Structured Finance Facility to research, development and
innovation projects and, together with the Commission, explore new ways of
using Community funds as levers for EIB loans’, the EIB engaged in ‘particularly
intensive’ co-operation with the Commission to develop such instruments
(European Investment Bank 2006: 55). Programmes such as ‘Jaspers’,
‘Jeremie’ and ‘Jessica’ signalled the move towards more financial instruments,
and hence closer to the Commission; a move not uncontested within the EIB
on grounds of autonomy considerations (interview #10). It reflected a slow
cultural change in the self-understanding of the EIB away from the infrastruc-
ture development bank of member states towards a promotional bank align-
ing with the EC. This shift was embraced at the highest level of the institution
in the context of the negative discourse on public banks, as it was seen as a
means to demonstrate the flexibility and usefulness of the EIB as a policy tool
(interview #9).
After these fundamental innovations in financial instruments in the mid-
2000s, the financial crisis would provide a substantial boost to their use.
Overall, the number of financial instruments supported by the multiannual
financial framework would rise to 26, 14 of which were administered by the
EC and/or the EIB (Núñez Ferrer and Infelise 2015: 15f). Owing to a re-dedica-
tion of EU funds, not only the number of instruments but also their volume
would grow substantially. From 2011 onwards, about €7bn would be rededi-
cated to financial instruments, eventually leading up to €16bn used during the
2007–2013 MFF instead of an envisaged 12.5bn (EC and EIB 2015: 3; European
Court of Auditors 2016: 30). The growth of these measures would require a
profound strengthening of inter-institutional co-ordination between the Euro-
pean Commission and the EIB, bringing the two institutions closer together.
As stated in a Commission document:
the increased use [of] Financial Instruments in Cohesion Policy has required
closer working relationships between the EIB and the European Commission (DG
Regio). For the Commission, this has meant a steep learning curve and, to a
certain extent, a reliance on EIB expertise in the development and implemen-
tation of FIs. (DG Internal Policies 2016b: 10, emphasis added)
The expansion of financial instruments to be administered by not only the
EIB but also NDBs now began to set a material incentive for member states to
found such a bank. This incentive, in conjunction with the rediscovered role of
development banks for weathering a crisis, explains the new wave of found-
ing NDBs in Europe. So, not surprisingly, the Commission highlighted the use
of financial instruments and structural funds when approving the creation of
these institutions under state aid considerations (European Commission
2014b, 2016b). As the EIB’s role has strengthened in the administration of
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European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF) since 2007, the co-operation
between EIB and NPBs has accordingly intensified, because European financial
instruments involve NDBs directly, including those administered by the EIB,
such as the Risk Sharing Finance Facility and Jeremie or its successors
COSME and InnovFin. The principle of subsidiarity, embedded in these instru-
ments, means that EIB/EIF is effectively dependent on NDBs and their local
knowledge to implement these programmes. At the same time, NDBs feel
pressure by their national governments to access these funds, moving the
relation between the two from competition to co-operation (interview #8).
As in prior periods, the bleak economic conditions called for another Euro-
pean ‘growth pact’. In June 2012, the heads of states agreed on a non-binding
pact to foster investment without straining national or European budgets. At
the heart of it was no ‘fresh money’, but a €10bn capital increase for the EIB to
boost lending, a EIB-based guarantee initiative (‘project bonds’), and a diffuse
plan to reallocate some of the structural funds. While demeaned as ‘hot air’, in
combination with the gradual processes of institution building, it laid the
latest fundament for an arrangement tying together the trends discussed:
The Investment Plan for Europe, through which the EIB expected a further
boost of programme contributions to financial instruments up to €35bn.
Into the spotlight: development banks and the Juncker Plan
When the immediate financial turmoil of the sovereign debt crisis somewhat
retreated, concerns about sluggish growth and low investment moved to the
forefront around the European elections of 2014. Shortly after his election,
Jean-Claude Juncker announced the Investment Plan for Europe and its
core piece, EFSI. A compromise between those political parties seeking a
strong public stimulus program funded by the EU, and those committed to
limit the size of the EU budget (Spiegel 2014), the plan appears as a merger
of the preceding steps in governance through development banking. While
it was launched jointly by the Commission and the EIB, it gave full operational
control to the EIB with the EFSI steering board located within the bank. The EIB
now seemed the evident choice for policy-makers to administer strategic
funds: it not only had extensive experience with respect to public infrastruc-
ture projects and was entrusted with other funds by the Commission, it was
also largely exempted from European state aid rules, permitting a relatively
low bureaucratic burden during the implementation phase (interview #3; #9).
In terms of logic, the EFSI works very much along the lines of financial
instruments. It entails guarantees of €16bn from the EU budget and €5bn
from the EIB that, combined, allow the EIB and the EIF to employ €63bn of
capital (leverage of 1:3). These €63bn are positioned to mobilize private and
public investment of €315bn in total (leverage of 1:5). As a recent report by
the EU Committee of the Regions put it, the EFSI is ‘a dedicated non pre-
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allocated Financial Instrument mechanism to leverage investment [and]
another recognition of the potential role of EU financial instruments in deliver-
ing growth-friendly expenditures’ (Núñez Ferrer and Infelise 2015: 9). In other
words, the EFSI opens a channel to increase investments through leveraging
limited budgetary resources and combining them with the levers of the EIB
and the EIF – a mechanism that in our view constitutes features of an invest-
ment state through the creation of governmental infrastructures.
The Investment Plan also draws heavily on the involvement of NDBs, their
technical expertise and capacity in identifying investment opportunities being
singled-out by the Commission as important capabilities for the success of the
plan. A largely unanticipated role would be played by NDBs when it came to
increase the fund’s financing capacities. In its first communique in November
2014, the Commission asked member states ‘to join this initiative, including by
providing further funding to the European Fund for Strategic Investments’
(European Commission 2014: 16). In the following eight months, such
additional financing would only be forthcoming from NDBs pledging funds
to support EFSI. Beginning with the German KfW in February 2015, which
pledged €8bn, overall eight development banks would pledge about €40bn
in total. NDBs became particularly more active once it became clear that
member states would not contribute any or any significant resources to the
plan. Based upon the subsidiarity principles, however, these funds were not
transferred to the EIB, but instead were lending commitments NDBs made
themselves in the context of projects financed by EFSI, which allowed them
to maintain control over their funds (interview #2; #3).
Through its provision of guarantees, EFSI also permitted NDBs to expand
their activities and organizational capabilities. The opportunity to regain
some of the momentum on the political scene by becoming pivotal actors
in the process of EFSI motivated the large and well-established NDBs in
Europe to act. In a joint letter to the Commission in April 2015, the large
development banks of France, Germany, Italy, Poland and Spain, as well as
the EIB announced that they ‘are prepared to contribute to the EU Invest-
ment Plan’ and ‘ready to expand our activities with the complementary
support of the increased EIB Group risk capacity’.8 Such activities would
include project finance, public–private partnerships for infrastructure pro-
jects as well as increasing engagement in securitization (BGK et al. 2015).
However, they made these statements conditional on being safeguarded
of EU regulatory interference in their activities particularly regarding state
aid regulations.
In July 2015, the Commission assuaged these concerns. Encouraging the
use of existing NDBs or founding new ones in the context of EFSI (European
Commission 2015b), it clarified that investments by NDBs were to be largely
exempted from state aid rules (ibid.: 6) and covered by block exemptions or
de minimis rules (EFSI SB 2016).9 Given that state aid rules are differently
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interpreted in each country, this new general framework makes co-operation
between different NDBs and the EIB much easier (interview #7). Furthermore,
the regulation provided by the EC in July 2015 helped to alleviate fears of the
EFSI taking up business of NDBs. The Commission, aware of competition
between the EIB and NDBs, stated that ‘EFSI should not be a substitute for
private market finance or products provided by national promotional banks
or institutions but should instead act as a catalyst for private finance’
(EU 2015). These concerns being soothed by the Commission, the large
NDBs in Europe continued to offer their support, announcing ‘further joint
instruments and initiatives … [that] could be developed by joint working
groups among NPBs and the EIB in connection with the EFSI’ (BPI et al.
2015: 10).10 Summarizing, the establishment of EFSI in 2014 further catalysed
the integration of the activities of NDBs with the EIB and the EC. This increase
resides in the reconfiguration and explicit articulation of their relationship
with the aim to calm institutional rivalry (interview #2).
Considering these changes in the European economic governance frame-
work cumulating since 1988, we can now assess the figuration of develop-
ment banking in the ‘new’, post-2008 European political economy. Figure 2
summarizes the expanding network of relationships via specific institutional
and financial innovations, showing it as much more intertwined and con-
nected than in the ‘old’ European political economy. Independent of the poss-
ible material impact on European investment, one can arguably see the
formation of a network based on the premise to mobilize and leverage
funds, share risks, and co-operate to facilitate investment. Most importantly,
and in contrast to Figure 1, co-operation is programmatic, based upon multi-
level networks and coalitions, which though not eliminating competing goals
and frictions, group around furthering investment more stringently than
before.
These institutional ties between the EIB and the NDBs are likely to solidify
owing to reforms and regulations following the Investment Plan for Europe.
The increasing interaction between NDBs and the EIB through these financial
instruments has been placed on a new level by the reconfiguration of
Figure 2. Development banks in the ‘new’ European political economy.
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structural funds into European Structural and Investment Funds in the MFF
2014–2020.11 Encouraging the use of financial instruments that can be
employed to complement projects within EFSI (European Commission 2015a,
2016), these reforms increase the areas of co-operation among NDBs and the
EIB. Shared management and implementation of structural funds-based finan-
cial instruments lie at the heart of this co-operation (DG Internal Policies 2016a,
12f); a construction NDBs have actively engaged in (interview #8). In the period
of 2014–2016, ESIF are supposed to account for 14 per cent of EU-wide public
investment (European Commission 2015: 4). Furthermore, in September 2016
the EC proposed an extension of the Investment Plan until 2020 and a bolster-
ing of the €16bn guarantee by 10bn. The EIB itself plans to contribute an
additional 2.5bn, aiming to mobilize a total of 500bn (instead of 315bn) over
the next years. The Commission has repeated here that:
In partnership with the EIB, NPBs play a key role in the implementation of the
Investment Plan, including the EFSI, as their product ranges, local knowledge
and geographical reach are complementary. They will remain key in the
extended EFSI, including in co-financing projects with the EIB and other inves-
tors. (European Commission 2016)
This statement speaks to the joint role of EIB and NDBs in bringing about
the desired investment push in the European Union based on co-financing
and complementarity. The multilevel network of development banks, linked
through financial instruments is actively fostered by the European Commis-
sion, as their joint activities increase its governance capabilities, gradually
‘unmuting’ the relationship with the EIB as the ‘bank of the EU’.
Conclusions: towards a hidden European investment state?
When focusing on the evolution of development banking in Europe, one can
observe the stepwise transformation of European economic governance in
which the European Union has developed a governmental infrastructure
that aims at facilitating investment through quasi-fiscal actors. In this
process, the European Commission has gradually expanded discretion over
investment vehicles, including the EIB. Through channelling its limited
public budget into financial instruments this development has created stron-
ger institutional ties between the European Commission, the EIB including the
EIF, and national development banks. As this analysis shows, the Investment
Plan for Europe is less of a brand-new counter-cyclical plan, but the latest
stage in this long-term evolution based on the idea of leveraging constrained
public budgets.
While it is unclear whether the Investment Plan can really deliver the prom-
ised investment impact (Godin 2016; Rubio et al. 2016), what is pivotal in our
perspective is how it has brought together rather disconnected aspects of
investment vehicles into a more coherent, network-based governance
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framework. We call this the nucleus of a European investment state, as it pro-
vides a multilevel governmental infrastructure focused on furthering invest-
ment. Based on the principles of subsidiarity and complementarity, this 
structure signals an expansion of European core powers that builds on –
but also holds material incentives for – member states founding or engaging 
development banks.
Two caveats, however, should be in place. First, given that the executive 
powers of this investment state are development banks, its core structures 
remain somewhat hidden with unclear and at least variegated effects on its 
material impact. In this sense, second, it differs markedly from an investment 
state of the old Keynesian type. Through financial instruments, the EU seeks to 
realize a greater fiscal impact than the size of its limited budget permits. 
Taking the form of guarantees and equity, this investment state works 
based on public–private partnerships and leveraging, and therefore requires 
less direct state spending. In this sense, it is less an endeavour in democratic 
economic government, but remains in the vein of technocratic governance.
It is important to note that this network, which remains work in progress, is 
not organized in a hierarchical way. As we demonstrate above, the EIB (the 
central node combining the EC, member states and NDBs) is not under the 
control of a single player and furthermore pursues its own interest. National 
development banks, conversely, also pursue their own interests as well as 
those of member states, when participating in these investment schemes. 
These actors are making use of Europe to expand their legitimacy and their 
own strategic positioning in policy processes. Thus, despite the demise of 
state banking in traditional terms, one cannot avoid the impression that the 
gradual increase of importance of both the EIB and NDBs rest upon a stepwise 
interest alignment, crucially between the Commission and member states.
The simple reason, as occurs to us, is that development banks have continu-
ously provided a means of economic policy making in the face of fiscal restraint. 
Nonetheless, it is unclear how stable or vulnerable the depicted nucleus is. Con-
solidating and expanding the governmental infrastructure will depend on the 
continued material incentives all the actors involved in the investment state 
derive. Should financial instruments turn out to burden state budgets, rather 
than relieving them, or be tainted by scandals of corruption, perceived advan-
tages might diminish and the coherence of the nucleus wane. Most definitely, 
the political dynamics around European development banking will provide 
fruitful ground for research and debate for years to come.
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2. Calculations based on each institutions’ financial report from 2008 and 2015 
respectively.
3. It is worth noting that the proponents of this analysis have also criticized the EIB for 
not fully employing its capabilities in the crisis and lagging behind a true 
counter-cyclical response to the economic recession.
4. An important qualification of the view presented here, however, can be found in 
Article 19 (ex Art. 21) of the EIB statute. It states that a project facing opposition 
from the EC can only be financed when the Board of Directors overrides the EC 
position in a unanimous vote, giving the EC more influence on EIB policy than our 
assessment of this period suggests.
5. See, for instance, http://www.eib.org/infocentre/blog/all/a-drive-along-italys-
roads.htm?lang=-en (accessed 1 June 2017).
6. The EIB welcomed these changes as part of their own adjustments to a changing 
economic and political environment, highlighting the need for the integration of 
loans to avoid ‘poorly planned and badly managed projects’ (European Invest-
ment Bank 1988: 15; see also Bussière et al. 2008: 206ff.).
7. This interaction of Western and Eastern European development banks also laid 
the foundation for an institutionalization of these collaborations in the 
Network of European Financial Institutions for SMEs founded in 1999 (inter-
view #8).
8. These six institutions also set up the equity fund Fonds Marguerite as part of the 
European Economy Recovery Plan (EERP) in 2010, whose main goal is to further 
infrastructure investment through the involvement of private and public 
institutional investors. The CDC, CDP and KfW also share an office in Brussels.
9. This position seems to have been a compromise between DG Regio and other 
expansionary forces within the EC and DG Competition, the guardian of state aid 
rules (for a thorough discussion of the latter see Volberding [2016]).
10. This is also an expression of the clout of the grown community of NDBs in Brus-sels, 
which not only intensified their co-operation with the EIB and the EIF, but also 
formed closer ties among each other to increase its influence upon rule making 
processes in the EU. While their formal co-operation was instituted in 1999 with 
the Network of European Financial Institutions for SMEs (NEFI), it has strongly 
deepened in the crisis and found new institutional venues, e.g. in the Long Term 
Investor Club (founded in 2009) or in its offshoot European Association of Long-
Term Investors (ELTI) (interview #7).
11. This reconfiguration also involves regional development banks, which benefit 
directly from European regional funds, as championed by DG Regio.
Acknowledgements
An earlier version of this article was presented at the 28th European Association for
Evolutionary Political Economy (EAEPE) Conference in Manchester, 3–5 November
2016, and the ‘Finance for Growth and Development’ Workshop at the University of
Cambridge, 29 November 2016. We thank all participants as well as two anonymous
reviewers for their time and their critical engagement with our argument. Sophia
Spornraft has provided valuable research assistance.
17
Notes
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‘legal entities carrying out financial activities on a professional basis which are given a 
mandate by a member state or a member state’s entity at central, regional or local 
level, to carry out development or promotional activities’ (EU 2015: 10).
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Table A1. List of interviewees for this article.
1 NGO official, EIB expert 18 May 2016 Brussels
2 KfW official 24 May 2016 Frankfurt
3 Former EC official 27 May 2016 Berlin
4 EIF officials 8 June 2016 Luxembourg
5 KfW official 22 June 2016 Frankfurt
6 MEP / ECON member 20 June 2016 Brussels
7 EIB official 6 July 2016 Luxembourg
8 KfW official 1 August 2016 Brussels
9 Former EIB official 2 August 2016 Luxembourg
10 Former EIB official 29 September 2016 Berlin
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